Using Safety Contracts to Guide the Maintenance of Systems and Safety Cases by Jaradat, Omar Tawffeeq Saleem & Bate, Iain
This is an author produced version of Using Safety Contracts to Guide the Maintenance of
Systems and Safety Cases.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/127467/
Proceedings Paper:
Jaradat, Omar Tawffeeq Saleem and Bate, Iain orcid.org/0000-0003-2415-8219 (2017) 
Using Safety Contracts to Guide the Maintenance of Systems and Safety Cases. In: 
Proceedings - 2017 13th European Dependable Computing Conference, EDCC 2017. 13th
European Dependable Computing Conference, EDCC 2017, 04-08 Sep 2017 Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. , pp. 95-102. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/EDCC.2017.20
promoting access to
White Rose research papers
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Using Safety Contracts to Guide the Maintenance of
Systems and Safety Cases
Omar Jaradat∗
∗School of Innovation, Design, and Engineering
Ma¨lardalen University
Va¨stera˚s, Sweden
Email: omar.jaradat@mdh.se
Telephone: +46 (21) 101369, Fax: +46 (21) 101460
Iain Bate∗†
†Department of Computer Science
University of York
York, United Kingdom
Email: iain.bate@york.ac.uk
Telephone: +44 (1904) 325572, Fax: +44 (1904) 325599
Abstract—Changes to safety critical systems are inevitable
and can impact the safety confidence about a system as their
effects can refute articulated claims about safety or challenge the
supporting evidence on which this confidence relies. In order to
maintain the safety confidence under changes, system developers
need to re-analyse and re-verify the system to generate new valid
items of evidence. Identifying the effects of a particular change
is a crucial step in any change management process as it enables
system developers to estimate the required maintenance effort
and reduce the cost by avoiding wider analyses and verification
than strictly necessary. This paper presents a sensitivity analysis-
based technique which aims at measuring the ability of a system
to contain a change (i.e., robustness) without the need to make
a major re-design. The proposed technique exploits the safety
margins in the budgeted failure probabilities of events in a
probabilistic fault-tree analysis to compensate for unaccounted
deficits or changes due to maintenance. The technique utilises
safety contracts to provide prescriptive data for what is needed to
be revisited and verified to maintain system safety when changes
happen. We demonstrate the technique on an aircraft wheel
braking system.
Keywords—sensitivity analysis, safety case, change impact, fail-
ure probabilities, maintenance.
I. INTRODUCTION
System safety is a major property that should be adequately
assured during the development process, the deployment and
the operation life of safety critical systems. System safety is
not assured by chance but rather it must be engineered and
evaluated in a systematic manner that might be mandated by
safety standards, best practices and experts’ recommendations.
Hence, safety critical systems are often subject to a compul-
sory or advisory certification process which often necessitates
building the systems in compliance with domain-specific safety
standards.
Following the standards’ prescriptions leads system de-
velopers to generate a lot of artefacts during and after the
development of their systems. These artefacts are used as
safety evidence to prove that the standards obligations and
recommendations were carried out. However, if the generated
artefacts are not demonstrated and explained properly, there
will be less certainty about their importance which may lead
the overall confidence being undermined. Therefore, develop-
ers of some safety critical systems construct a safety case (also
known as “assurance case”) to demonstrate the safety aspect
of a system by identifying all potential risks and describing, in
the light of the available evidence, how these risks have been
eliminated or duly mitigated.
Typically, safety critical systems are evolutionary and they
are always exposed to both predicted and unpredicted changes
during the different stages in their lifecycle. Changes to a
system can negatively affect the gained confidence because
these changes have the potential to compromise the safety
evidence which has been already collected. More clearly, evi-
dence after a change might no longer support the developers’
claims because it reflects old development artefacts or old
assumptions about operation or the operating environment. In
addition, the cost of obtaining certification is significant, with
estimates such as 30% of lifecycle costs [5] and 25-75% of
development costs [20] are spent on certification [3]. Hence,
improper handling of system changes in the safety cases can
reflect untrue safety status of the systems and it can also waste
significant amount of the certification cost.
Despite clear recommendations to adequately maintain and
review the systems and their safety cases by safety standards,
existing standards offer little or no advice on how such
operations can be carried out [21]. Hence, there is an increas-
ing need for globally acceptable methods and techniques to
enable easier change accommodation in safety critical systems
without incurring disproportionate cost compared to the size
of the change. However, since broader re-verification and re-
validation require more effort and time, it is important for any
proposal that aims at facilitating system changes to localise the
impact of the changes. More specifically, to alleviate the cost
of updating both a system and its safety case due to a change,
it is crucial to minimise the effects of that change and prevent
these effects from propagating into other parts of the system
as far as it is practically possible.
In our previous work [12], we introduced a Sensitivity
ANalysis for Enabling Safety Argument Maintenance (SANE-
SAM) technique that supports system engineers to accom-
modate some types of potential changes. We also developed
SANESAM+ [9] as a modified version of SANESAM that cov-
ers wider variety of changes. The key principle of SANESAM
and SANESAM+ is to determine the flexibility (or robustness)
of a system to changes using sensitivity analysis. The output is
a ranked list of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) events that system
engineers can refine. The result after the refinement is a list of





Contract ID: Contr_LOOBS1
G1: The MAFP for the event LOOBS1 is ≤ 1.018E-03 
A1: No duplicates of LOOBS1 in the FTA where the failure probability ≥ 1.034E-06 
A2: The logic in FTA remains the same 
(Option 1.)
A3: BSS1EF MAFP ≤ 7.0368E-04 
A4: BSS1PSF FP ≤ 3.17E-04 
(Option 2.)
A3: BSS1EF MAFP ≤ 9.505E-04 
A4: BSS1PSF FP ≤ 6.75E-05 (No Change) 
(Option 3.)
A3: BSS1EF FP ≤ 1.50E-04 (No Change) A4: BSS1PSF MFP ≤ 8.68E-04  
Fig. 7. A derived safety contract
contracts. Also the contract notation in Figure 3-b is used
to annotate the contracted events. Each contract considers
multiple assumptions options based on the number of the
children events. Figure 5 shows the derived contracts using
the contract notations in grey. Figure 7 provides an internal
view of the Contr LOOBS1 contract which is derived for the
event LOOBS1 as an example.
Step 3. Associate the derived contracts with the safety
argument: In this example, we use a GSN argument fragment
to show the association. Figure 6 shows how the derived safety
contracts from FTA are associated with a safety argument
fragment for WBS using the proposed contract notation in
Figure 3-a. We do not want to affect the way GSN is being
produced but we want to bring additional information for
developers’ attention. It is worth mentioning that a safety
contract should be associated with all claims that are related to
the event which the contract is derived for. For example, the
safety contract Contr SWFSTS2PAS2F should be associated
with any articulated claims about the state when Switch Failed
Stuck to System 2 Position and System 2 Fails.
Now, let us assume some change scenarios that can resem-
ble real life change requests.
Change request scenario (1): The WBS developers have
received a change request from the senior management asking
to replace the current installed power supplies in BSCU 1
and 2 by a different model. Based on the provided product
specifications by the new power supplies manufacturer, the FP
of that model is 3.00E-04, which means that it is less reliable
than the FP of the current model in use (i.e., 6.75E-05).
Subsequently, step 4 should be followed to assess the impact
of the given change scenario.
Step 4. Check the ability of FTA to contain greater
FP(s) than those already exist: As a quick check, we want
to update the FPs of the affected events based on the new
given FPs and calculate the new FP of the top event. The
new FP of the top event after the replacement is 1.646E-06
and since 1.646E-06 < 3.3E-05, the increments to the FPs
of BSS1PSF and BSS2PSF are tolerated (i.e., containable) in
the FTA but the question is: Where can they be contained?
To answer this question we need to specify the affected
contracts by the change and check whether or not they still
hold in the light of the new FP. The change request will af-
fect four contracts, namely, Contr LOOBS1, Contr LOOBS2,
Contr LOOBS1 D and Contr LOOBS2 D. Each derived con-
tract contains different options in the assumptions list (as
shown in Figure 7). We choose (Option 1.) in the four
contracts and check if the MAFPs of BSS1PSF or BSS2PSF
can contain the new FP. Since 3.16E-04 (MAFP) > 3.00E-
04 (new FP), the increments to BSS1PSF and BSS2PSF are
contained in the four contracts and they still hold. This implies
that replacing the power supply is rated as a GREEN change
which means (according to Table I) that there is no need to
make any structural changes to the system design nor the safety
argument. However, a manual check for the argument is still
needed to replace the information of the old power supply with
new valid information. For example, the description which the
context CxtPSDesc refers to (in Figure 6) is out of date and
should be replaced by the new power supply description.
Step 5. Re-balance the FPs of the FTA’s events as a
preparation for future changes: The reduction in the margins
of the BSS1PSF and BSS2PSF FPs should be shared by all of
the events in the FTA. That is, all current FPs should contribute
to make up the contraction of BSS1PSF and BSS2PSF FP
margins due to the power supply replacement, as follows:
1) Find ∆FP(Topevent) which is the difference be-
tween the required FP (i.e., 3.30E-05) and the
new FPCurrent(Topevent) after containing the change
which we have determined earlier (i.e., 1.646E-06).
∆FP(Topevent)= 3.136E-05.
2) Repeat Step 1-ii (i.e., the SANESAM+ approach which
we have already mentioned under Step 1 in this Subsec-
tion) to distribute 3.136E-05 over all FPs’ margins in the
FTA. The grey squashed rectangles in Figure 5 represent
the new MAFPs after the change.
Step 6. Update the affected safety contracts: Since new
MAFPs have been calculated for all of the events, all derived
contracts should be updated to reflect the new MAFP values.
Change request scenario (2): This scenario is similar to
scenario (1). The only difference though is the FP value of the
new power supply model, which is in this case equals to 5.00E-
03 and thus it has less reliability than the current FP and even
lesser than the one from the first scenario. As a quick check,
the FP of the top event after introducing the change is 2.8106E-
05, which means that it is < FPRequired(Topevent) and thus the
change is tolerable. By applying the same steps we did in the
previous scenario we will find out that Contr BSS1&2DNO is
the contract which contains the change.
Change request scenario (3): This scenario is similar to
the previously discussed scenarios (2) and (3). The difference
here is that the FP value of the new power supply model
is 6.00E-03, which means that it has less reliability than the
current FP and it is the least reliable in this the three scenarios.
The new calculated FP for the top event of this scenario
is 3.9432E-05 and it is > 3.3E-05 (the MAFP for the top
event). That is, the resultant change effects due to replacing
the power supply by this specific model is not containable and
the entire FTA is going to be impacted. Hence, the WBS cannot
meet its current safety requirements without considering major
structural changes or updates.
Figure 8 shows a high level view of the change effects
in the FTA that is caused by replacing the power supply in
the three discussed change scenarios. The figure also shows
how the safety contracts are used to highlight the affected
parts in the WBS design and the safety argument. More

